Early Engagement of Safety and Mission Assurance Expertise Using Systems Engineering Tools: A Risk-Based Approach to Early Identification of Safety and Assurance Requirements by Beckman, Sean & Darpel, Scott
Early Engagement of Safety & Mission Assurance Expertise Using Systems 
Engineering Tools: A Risk-Based Approach to Early Identification of Safety and 
Assurance Requirements 
 
Scott Darpel, Sean Beckman 
 
NASA John H. Glenn Research Center, 21000 Brookpark Rd, Cleveland, Oh 44135, Email: 
scott.e.darpel@nasa.gov, sean.m.beckman@nasa.gov  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Decades of systems engineering practice have 
demonstrated that the earlier the identification of 
requirements occurs, the lower the chance that costly 
redesigns will needed later in the project life cycle. A 
better understanding of all requirements can also 
improve the likelihood of a design’s success. Significant 
effort has been put into developing tools and practices 
that facilitate requirements determination, including 
those that are part of the model-based systems 
engineering (MBSE) paradigm. These efforts have 
yielded improvements in requirements definition, but 
have thus far focused on a design’s performance needs. 
The identification of safety & mission assurance 
(S&MA) related requirements, in comparison, can occur 
after preliminary designs are already established, 
yielding forced redesigns. Engaging S&MA expertise at 
an earlier stage, facilitated by the use of MBSE tools, 
and focused on actual project risk, can yield the same 
type of design life cycle improvements that have been 
realized in technical and performance requirements.  
 
1. THE “HIDDEN FACTORY” OF 
REQUIREMENTS/DESIGN REWORK 
 
Within the process improvement profession, a lot of 
time is dedicated to unearthing what is called the 
“hidden factory”. This is a term to describe the myriad 
of steps in a process that evolve to deal with defects or 
other unplanned outcomes. These steps represent a drain 
on, or redirection of, valuable resources. They are often 
taken for granted, but do not add any value to the 
product. One example of a hidden factory would be the 
lost luggage department of an airline, with the defect 
addressed being a piece of lost luggage. No airline set 
out to design the need to deal with lost luggage into 
their original baggage handling process, as they did not 
intend to lose any pieces. And yet, all airlines have that 
counter at airports to do just that.  Over time, these 
hidden drains on resources can creep into any process, 
even product development, where unplanned changes 
can be considered a defect.  
 
Any product development team, whether in the 
aerospace, automotive, or consumer goods industries, 
can relate a simple fact: the later in the life cycle a 
change is made, the higher the impact to cost, schedule, 
and likely performance or success. Many such changes 
are the result of late identification of, or modification to, 
a product requirement. The more complex a system to 
be developed is, the higher the likelihood that such a 
miss or modification occurs. Just as with lost luggage, 
these unplanned changes are something that teams need 
to spend time addressing, pulling resources away from 
the true design effort, or increasing cost and schedule. 
Figure 1 illustrates the “hidden factory” steps that result 
from requirements “defects” in a the early steps of a 
typical NASA design life cycle. 
 
 
Figure 1: The "Hidden Factory" of requirements/design 
rework within the NASA design life cycle. 
A significant amount of effort has gone into improving 
the process of capturing requirements within product 
development, such as that within systems engineering. 
A great deal of emphasis within systems engineering is 
focused on the identification, development, and 
management of project requirements.  In his paper, 
“Systems engineering return on investment”, Eric 
Honour cites the potential payback of 7 to 1 on project 
cost savings vs. investment in systems engineering 
efforts[1], much of which is due to this focus.    
 
Systems engineering has evolved both as a discipline, 
and as a set of tools and practices that facilitate the kind 
of payback discussed by Honour. The “V” development 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160014878 2019-08-29T16:03:20+00:00Z
cycle depicted in Figure 2 illustrates both the relative 
timing and interaction of all the key life cycle activities, 
including requirements development and management.  
This development of requirements begins with the 
translation of customer and stakeholder needs during 
concept development.  
 
 
Figure 2: The Systems Engineering "V" approach to 
project life cycle [2]. 
It is during the concept development phase where 
projects begin to capture what is often referred to as the 
“voice of the customer” (VOC), which can be stated in 
terms of performance needs, goals, or objectives 
(NGOs). Teams translate these NGOs into requirements 
that are actionable, and are able to be verified. This 
VOC effort exists in product development in all 
industries, and has inspired the development of such 
practices as Design for Six Sigma, Concurrent 
Engineering, Concept Engineering, and Pugh Concept 
Selection. Within the aerospace and defense industry, 
this tends to be part of a stage-gate design philosophy 
capped with some sort of requirements review. 
Development projects within NASA most often follow 
the systems engineering practices and reviews specified 
in NPR 7123.1, “NASA Systems Engineering Practices 
and Requirements”. 
 
2. MODEL BASED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
 
While the concepts of, and practices for systems 
engineering, including the “V” approach, have been 
implemented to some degree for decades, the recent 
efforts surrounding the Model Based Systems 
Engineering (MBSE) movement has provided a 
significant set of new tools which  has greatly improved 
the effectiveness of the translation of VOC into 
requirements. These tools allow teams to model and 
simulate systems at early stages, before committing to 
any specific hardware architectures or choices. 
 
MBSE makes use of the Systems Modeling Language 
(SysML) as a means of creating a representation of the 
system under development.  SysML is an offshoot of the 
Universal Modeling Language (UML) that was 
developed in the 90’s to help software engineers create 
a representation of the software system that was to be 
developed. UML is managed by the Object 
Management Group [3] and has been accepted by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as 
a modelling standard. The overlap and extensions of 
each set is shown in Figure 3. Both SysML and UML 
allow teams to represent how their systems should 
behave and interact with those who are using them.    
 
 
Figure 3: Overlap between UML & SysML tools 
Within SysML, there are two main categories of 
diagrams that allow teams to represent the system: 
behavior diagrams and structure diagrams (see Figure 
4). Early on, it is the set of behavior diagrams that have 
become valuable in the VOC to requirements translation 
process. Activity, sequence, state-machine, and use case 
diagrams give teams a way to represent what the system 
to be developed is supposed to do, per the NGOs of 
their customers and stakeholders. For the purposes of 
this paper, the Activity and Use Case diagrams will be 
explored further for their utility in improving the 
engagement of S&MA expertise. 
 
 
Figure 4: The 9 Diagrams of SysML 
Activity diagrams help teams represent a process a 
given system is to perform. Any one system may be 
comprised of a number of activities, based on what the 
end-user needs are. These diagrams can be thought of as 
the modelling equivalent of a process map or 
operational concept. Lenny Delligatti, author of SysML 
Distilled, describes them as “a dynamic view of the 
system the expresses sequences of behaviors and event 
occurrences over time” [4]. They detail what steps are to 
be taken, and in what order.  
 
Use Case diagrams represent how the system and its 
activities interact with users, also called actors.  These 
diagrams allow teams to depict and model how these 
actors, including things like the environment the system 
is to be used in, “touch” the system. Use of activity and 
use case diagrams, along with MBSE in general, has 
improved the effectiveness of requirements 
identification and definition, in terms of the 
performance requirements for a desired system but has 
not eliminated the need for re-design on many projects 
 
3. CURRENT PARADIGM FOR S&MA 
ENGAGEMENT & REQUIREMENTS 
IDENTIFICATION 
 
Within projects following the stage-gate design process 
described in in NPR 7123.1, a project’s requirements 
are reviewed at the System Requirements Review 
(SRR) stage, but this, again, focuses on the performance 
requirements. Figure 5 shows the design milestone 
reviews from NPR 7123.1 and typical safety reviews, 
superimposed onto the systems engineering “V” 
paradigm. 
 
 
Figure 5: Systems engineering "V" paradigm with NPR 
7123.1 and typical safety reviews superimposed. PDR is 
Preliminary Design Review; CDR is Critical Design 
Review 
With the exception of some risk management focusing 
on performance NGOs, it is not until after a preliminary 
design is in hand that significant S&MA expertise is 
brought to bear on the project.  Typically, the 
preliminary hazards assessment (PHA) is performed 
based on the preliminary design. Indeed, the first safety 
review is most often held after the preliminary design 
review (PDR), and can result in the need to redesign the 
system to address required safety features. The worst 
case scenario of waiting until this point in the design life 
cycle could be a complete abandonment of the 
preliminary design or concept if it is not possible to 
address or include required factors of safety or hazard 
controls. Figure 6 superimposes typical S&MA 
engagement on the same “V” paradigm. 
 
 
Figure 6: "V" paradigm with typical S&MA engagement 
Although the S&MA community contains a rich 
mixture of expertise that can be thought of as another 
stakeholder in the system, it is often treated with 
skepticism in terms of adding value to a project. This is 
primarily due to a large set of requirements being added 
late in the life cycle that may or may not be associated 
with actual project risks. By delaying S&MA 
engagement, projects can arrive at a point that selection 
of an alternate concept is infeasible from a cost or 
budget standpoint, requiring concessions to function or 
performance to incorporate required safety or hazard 
controls.  
 
A new paradigm, one that includes early engagement of 
S&MA expertise following a risk-based approach to the 
application of appropriate requirements and practices, 
can lead to a reduction in redesign efforts. The question 
considered was how to effectively implement such a 
paradigm shift, such that S&MA requirements can be 
both identified earlier, and provide real value to project 
success. Looking to the success of MBSE efforts can be 
used as an inspiration for such a shift.  
 
4. INTEGRATING S&MA TOOLS INTO MODEL 
BASED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, CURENT 
EFFORTS 
 
The advantages of modeling behaviors and interactions 
using MBSE methods has been recognized by a growing 
number of S&MA leaders. As far back as 2004, there 
have been efforts to examine how the S&MA expertise 
might either benefit from, participate in, or enhance the 
model development. Initially, these efforts have focused 
on the application of such S&MA domain tools as PRA, 
FMEA, or reliability analysis within a MBSE-type 
concept model. Or, within a similarly focused, early-life 
cycle model that could be used to enhance requirements 
identification and definition.  
 
 In his paper “Integrating Failure Modes and Effects 
with the System Requirements Analysis”, Dr. Ronald 
Carson, introduces the concept of functional failures to 
allow analysts to identify potential system failures while 
the requirements are still being formulated and assigned 
to a piece of the functional architecture [5].  In essence, 
the proposed method has requirements analysts assign 
failure modes to functions that are modelled within the 
SE tool, thereby getting a jump on the failure modes and 
effects analysis that might yield insight into additional 
potential requirements. While this represents a 
significant step forward in early risk-informed 
requirements, some project and engineering leads may 
avoid the implied formality of a tool like FMEA. In 
2014, Hecht, Dimpfl, and Pinchak examined the ability 
to auto-generate an FMEA from SysML models [6]. 
Again, a powerful step towards earlier S&MA 
consideration and potential requirements, but still 
focused on a potentially limited audience, current 
practitioners of FMEA.  
 
In 2015, John Evans (NASA HQ), Steven Cornford 
(JPL), and Martin Feather (JPL) published a white paper 
and article through the NASA Office of Safety & 
Mission Assurance (OSMA) examining the concept of 
Model-Based Mission Assurance (MBMA) and its 
potential to enhance reliability and maintainability 
analysis during concept development [7]. The article 
surveys the landscape of efforts like Carson’s, and 
determined the need to “clearly and unambiguously 
establish the roles of uncertainty and risk in the system 
model”. The goal has been to identify how to 
incorporate such tools as Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
(PRA) and Continuous Risk Management (CRM) earlier 
into the project life cycle.  
 
5. CREATING A MORE INCLUSIVE 
FRAMEWORK FOR S&MA ENGAGEMENT 
DURING CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 
 
The efforts described, as well as many others, will go a 
long way to improving the quality of the models used to 
assist with requirements identification and definition. 
They have, in large part, focused on the specifics of tool 
interaction, such as in how one software tool used in the 
development of a reliability and maintainability (R&M) 
model can interact with those doing system functional 
modeling. What is also needed, however, is a way to 
actively engage the overall S&MA expertise and 
improve the value-proposition of using such tools, but 
without the specifics often involved in the software 
packages. The question under consideration is how to 
engage people with expertise in S&MA domains 
without the often complicating factor of software tool 
specifics. Referring back to Evans et al, what role can 
S&MA expertise play in concept and early stage model 
development?   
 
When teams set out to create an Activity or Use Case 
diagram, one of the most effective methods may be 
considered one of the most old-fashioned: live and in 
person. Since the early days of their use, the creation of 
process maps is best done using a team approach, 
including those people impacted or served by the 
process. Developing an Activity Diagram, where a 
desired system process is going to be represented is no 
different. The more care given to having the correct 
expertise at the activity, including S&MA, will yield a 
better, more accurate depiction and model.  
 
When constructing an activity diagram to depict a 
desired behavior for the system, the team starts by 
listing those steps it believes are the proper ones to 
execute, in their relative order. By taking  the additional 
step of asking “is there anything hazardous about this 
step”, “how can this step go wrong or fail”, and “is there 
any kind of risk associated with performing this step” 
the team may identify unconsidered steps or conditions. 
This represents a risk-aware view of the concept under 
development. It forces the team to consider not just how 
they want a system to behave, but the ways by which it 
may fail to do so, or create hazards for the users. Not 
only is this a useful method by which to prevent 
redesigns later in the life cycle, it can also cause team 
members to think about and question the robustness of 
the activities. S&MA personnel often have a very deep 
understanding of typical system failure modes and can 
facilitate this type of discussion. Engaging S&MA 
expertise during the development of activity diagrams 
will help teams to consider whether certain safety or 
assurance requirements may result in a better concept.  
 
Use case diagrams can be thought of in much the same 
way. As stated earlier, these diagrams depict how users, 
or actors, interact with the system. For example, a “crew 
member” may interact with the activity called “enter 
mode”. In the early concept development stage, there 
will not be a specific manner by which this interaction 
occurs, only that it does. Still, the team can consider 
what the different ways this interaction can go wrong 
are.  This could include “crew member enters the wrong 
mode”, or “system executes the wrong mode”. Both of 
these items represent a risk to the system not behaving 
as required. Teams might consider adding activities for 
the system to verify that the proper mode is being 
selected. While this simplified example may appear to 
be common sense, something addressed through good 
design, it may not be identified until after a first set of 
software or sample hardware is delivered.  
 
 
Figure 7: ""V" with Earlier S&MA Engagement 
The objective is to draw S&MA expertise earlier into 
the concept development and requirements 
identification steps, as seen in Figure 7. Using it in the 
development of activity or use case diagrams, or similar 
early system behavior determination, allows the team to: 
• Identify potential hazards and their requisite 
levels of control 
• Identify a larger pool of potential risks that can 
help with concept trade studies 
• Identify good practices early that could limit 
consequences or reduce the likelihood for 
performance risks 
 
S&MA personnel, typically being those charged with 
the later development of safety data packages and 
reviews, are often keenly aware of what different 
carriers or programs may require for hazards of any 
type. For example, by understanding very early that a 
certain fluid is required for an experiment, teams can 
make an informed choice about controls that may be 
required due to toxicity levels.   
 
For the purposes of concept exploration, the notional 
example of a human powered delivery system is 
considered. A team is tasked with developing a new 
delivery system that will increase the company’s range, 
while adhering to a 30-minute cycle time. The following 
use case and activity diagrams can be considered an 
example of the typical output from such effort, 
following traditional flows without early S&MA 
engagement. 
 
 
Figure 8: Typical use case diagram for example 
delivery system 
From the use case depicted in Figure 8, the team has 
identified two potential actors: the “rider”, being the 
human in the human-powered system, and the 
environment. The specific use case shows what 
activities the “rider” interacts with. In this case, the rider 
must load cargo, accelerate and decelerate.  
 
 
Figure 9: Typical activity diagram for example delivery 
system 
In the activity diagram in Figure 9, the team has 
captured what was felt to be a primary process, starting 
with load cargo, and completing with unload cargo.  
 
After going through the exercise of creating the use case 
and activity diagrams, the team could have come up 
with a set of performance requirements, such as those 
listed in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10: Example requirements derived from use case 
and activity diagrams. 
User needs, as modelled through the diagrams, are 
translated into a requirements set. This initial set of 
requirements is reviewed at a System Requirements 
Review, or similar. Once this set of requirements passes 
review, work begins on the preliminary design, 
reviewed at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR). 
Typically, there are some concerns that require redesign 
as determined by reviewers. At times, this can require 
requirements re-work. After the PDR is passed, teams 
work on the initial safety reviews (Phase 0/1). This 
review can then lead to even more requirements rework. 
 
If the team in the example, however, includes S&MA 
expertise during the development of the diagrams, 
expertise that can facilitate asking “what can go wrong 
with this step or interaction”, it may determine that extra 
attention should be paid to the activity “load cargo”. 
Additionally, the S&MA expertise involved with the 
development of the diagrams can help determine if there 
are any applicable regulations or laws that should 
considered.  
 
 
Figure 11: Enhanced use case with S&MA engagement 
As an example, the city in which the company operates 
may have helmet ordinances which could prompt the 
team to include a requirement for helmet stowage. Per Figure 11, the team also determined that, as the cargo 
could be improperly loaded, a new requirement for a 
locking feature would be included. The team may even 
consider an operational requirement to ensure the cargo 
is locked in place. This, in turn, can lead to a 
requirement to ensure that the rider can inspect the 
condition.  
 
 
Figure 12: Enhanced activity diagram with S&MA 
engagement 
Looking at the revised activity diagram in Figure 12, 
the team chose to depict the questions being asked as 
decision points in the activity flow. They could continue 
by examining each step on the activity diagram, 
determining if additional requirements can benefit the 
system, or reduce the risk associated with its success. 
This, in turn, may be just one of the activities they need 
to consider.  
 
The proposed method focuses on personnel engagement 
in a software tool-neutral setting to bring more expertise 
into the early stages of determining what a system 
should do. There are a great many different tools on the 
market for creating MBSE models, as well as 
performing S&MA activities such as FMEA or PRA, 
with some organizations even creating in-house 
packages, as well. Teams should allow the process of 
development to determine the needs of software tool use 
and interaction, rather than having those tools dictate 
the process followed.  
 
6. SUMMARY 
 
While there are a great many possibilities for bringing 
specific S&MA models and analyses into direct 
interaction with those models created during early-phase 
concept development (within MBSE), the first step is 
engaging the S&MA personnel and expertise earlier in 
the requirements definition phase. This can be 
accomplished by adding the additional considerations 
and personnel during the development of such MBSE 
products as the activity and use case diagrams, 
exploring the risks inherent in the concepts under 
development. Doing so, engaging S&MA expertise to 
facilitate the questions “what can go wrong” or “what is 
hazardous about this”, can significantly reduce the need 
to perform redesign later the in the life cycle due to 
missed requirements. A team may also find they have an 
advantage in creating initial sets of risks and hazards 
that can improve concept trades or design reviews. The 
ultimate evolution of Model-Based Mission Assurance 
will be the natural off shoot of this engagement, creating 
much more robust system models. Finally, the proposed 
paradigm reinforces a risk-aware or risk-informed 
process for the application of additional requirements, 
again, reducing the likelihood of redesigns later in the 
life cycle. 
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